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Neste trabalho analisamos a evidência
sobre o comportamento dos retornos das
acções das empresas privatizadas em
Portugal entre 1989 e 2001. O objectivo do
nosso trabalho foi de recolher evidência
sobre o desempenho em bolsa de uma
amostra abrangente de operações
públicas de privatização e avaliar os
factores determinantes do desempenho
observado. Os resultados obtidos
confirmam a existência de retornos
anormais positivos no dia e mês após a
venda das acções em bolsa, mas os
retornos são de reduzida magnitude e
com reduzida significância estatística.
Além disso, os retornos observados para
as acções das empresas privatizadas são
inferiores aos observados para empresas
privadas que realizaram Ofertas Públicas
Iniciais. No longo prazo, o desempenho é
negativo mas superior ao observado para
as acções de empresas privadas que
efectuaram OPIs. Os resultados sugerem
assim que há reversão parcial dos
retornos iniciais e ainda que os
investidores exigem retornos mais
elevados para acções de empresas que
são privatizadas parcialmente.
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Abnormal Returns in Privatization Public Offerings: 
The Case of Portuguese Firms
La présente étude analyse les rendements
excédentaires des émissions relevant de pri-
vatisations au Portugal dans le période de
1989 à 2001. Nous étudions les perfor-
mances boursières, initiale et à moyen et
long terme, pour un échantillon qui comporte
l’ensemble des privatisations portugaises
(ouverture initiale et ventes subséquentes), et
les facteurs qui expliquent cette performance.
Les offres des entreprises publiques obser-
vent un rendement initial positif mais modes-
te, vis-à-vis le rendement de référence et, en
moyenne, sont moins rentables que celles
achevées par les entreprises au capital privé.
Les rendements excédentaires cumulés
registrent une performance négative pendant
une période de 3 à 5 ans, mais la perte est
inférieure à celle générée par les émissions
initiales de entreprises au capital privé. Les
résultats suggèrent donc que le rendement
initial est partiellement reversé et que les
actionnaires demandent des rendements
supérieurs pour les privatisations partielles. 
This paper provides evidence on abnormal
returns of Portuguese privatization public
offerings for the period from 1989 to 2001.
This study explores the abnormal
performance of a comprehensive sample of
Portuguese privatization transactions and
investigates the determinants of the observed
price behavior. We find some evidence of the
underpricing phenomenon for privatized
offerings but initial returns are low and barely
significant. The results show further that
privatization IPOs underperform private
sector IPOs. In the long run, we observe
negative abnormal returns. While in early
event months, privatization public offerings
yield more negative returns than private
sector offerings, this effect is reversed in
longer horizon periods. Initial underpricing is
thus partially reversed and investors seem to
require higher returns in partial privatizations.
JEL Classification: G38; G32Abnormal Returns in Privatization Public Offerings: 
The Case of Portuguese Firms
Carla Vieira; Ana Paula Serra
A considerably high number of studies document the phenomenon of underpricing of privatized
firms in the short run and positive abnormal performance in the long run. This study measures
short- and long-term abnormal returns to investors in Portuguese privatization public offerings
and investigates the determinants of the observed price behavior. The empirical analysis is
based on a comprehensive sample of privatization transactions that took place on the
Portuguese stock exchange for the period from 1989 to 2001.
Documenting and understanding the short- and long-term market performance of privatization
public offerings in different countries can shed light on the debate upon the impact of privatization
programs on the firm’s value and on whether the performance is tied to particular characteristics
of a privatization program (aims, strategies and methods). The contribution of this paper is to
extend the analysis of the literature on privatization public offerings providing additional evidence
regarding a single country program. Previous empirical studies are mainly multi-country studies
that analyze transactions across markets or single-country studies that focus on “voucher”
privatization programs of economies in transition (countries from Central and Eastern Europe).
Our paper tests several theoretical predictions that have been put forward in the literature. In
particular we investigate the role of political strategies and dual listing in the short and long run
performance of privatization public offerings.
Our results are not supportive of the underpricing phenomenon except when we exclude the very
extreme observations. Our results show further that privatization IPOs underperform private
sector IPOs. These results contradict most of the previous evidence1. The degree of underpricing
seems to reflect uncertainty and not a strategic political policy to retain power.
In the long run, we observe negative abnormal returns contradicting the most recent evidence2.
While in early event months, privatization public offerings yield more negative returns than
private sector offerings, this effect is reversed in longer horizon periods3. Initial underpricing is
thus partially reversed and investors seem to require higher returns in partial privatizations. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the Portuguese
privatization program. Section 3 describes the sample. In Sections 4 and 5 we review the
relevant literature, describe the tests and variables and present the results for, respectively, the
short and long run market performance. Section 6 concludes our study.
The Portuguese privatization program started in 1989, well after the privatization wave in
developed European countries initiated by Margaret Thatcher’s British government back in the
early 1980’s. The late launch of the program was due to the political and legal environment
created by the 1974 Revolution and the massive process of nationalizations that followed4. Only
in 1998 as a part of a broad set of economic reforms, was the transfer of state holdings to the
1. Introduction
1 See for example Choi and Nam (1998) that look at 185 PIPOs from 30 countries over the period from 1981 to
1997. Yet some studies on Central and Eastern European privatization offerings also find that the difference in
initial returns between IPOs and Private IPOs is insignificant.
2 Megginson, Nash, Netter and Schwartz (2000) find positive and statistically positive long-run (1-5 years)
returns for a sample of 158 PIPOs from 33 countries from 1981 to 1997.
3 This result is consistent with recent empirical literature that finds Privatization Initial Public Offers (PIPOs)
outperforming private IPOs. Moreover, there is worldwide evidence of negative long-term returns for private
IPOs (see for example Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001).
4 The nationalization process in Portugal started in 1975 and was extensive to all sectors in the economy:
banks, insurance companies, oil, transport, energy, telecommunications, pulp and paper, beverages, etc.
2. The Portuguese Privatization Programprivate sector begun. Initially only sales of minority shareholding positions were allowed but that
was changed in 1990, when the Law of Privatization was approved. The main stated objectives
of the privatization program therein, were similar to those announced in most European
countries. Besides the reduction of state ownership in itself, the program aimed at raising cash to
reduce public debt and budget deficits; improving economic efficiency through the use of markets
to allocate resources; submitting companies to transparent corporate governance rules;
developing domestic capital markets; and disseminating share ownership5.
The privatization methods used by the Portuguese government changed over time but the
preferred method was sales through Public Offerings held in the Portuguese stock exchange.
The method of Direct Sales was used, exceptionally, for small companies, and supposedly when
national political and economic interests were at stake6.
Table 1 shows the annual proceeds of the privatization public offerings over the period from 1989
to 2001. Sales were spread over time but 1992, 1997 and 1998 were important years with sales
amounting to respectively, 1.3, 2 and 2.2 billion Euros. Total capital raised amounted to 8.8 billion
Euros in 66 transactions. There was a predominance of partial privatizations and over time, there
were important differences in the transactions, in particular regarding the industries of the privatized
firms7. By 2001, privatized firms accounted for more than 50% of total market capitalization.
We have identified the transactions in Dathis, a financial database compiled by the Portuguese
stock exchange and that is the most comprehensive data set on Portuguese stocks. We have
collected data on offer size, initial offer prices, offer dates and quotes. 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for gross proceeds of the transactions that constitute our
sample. The sample includes 42 privatization transactions, of which 19 are initial offers
(Privatization Initial Public Offers – PIPOs) and 23 are secondary (seasoned) offers (Privatization
Seasoned Public Offers – PSPOs). Inevitably PSPOs are more common in later years, and after
1998, the Portuguese government only launched subsequent offers. The proceeds of the 42
privatization transactions in the sample represent 96% of the total proceeds of all privatization
public offers in Portugal for the period analyzed. The remaining transactions refer to sales of
small firms that were sold on the stock exchange but were not listed on the main regular market8.
As documented in other privatization studies (see for example Jelic and Briston, 2003), the
effective open market trading of the shares of privatized firms after the official IPO date is often a
long process and there is a substantial variance in time to listing across firms. This delay results
from the design of the operation, in particular legal constraints on trading9. For the PIPOs in the
sample, the median time to listing was 43 days.




5 By the end of 1988, the Portuguese stock market was short-lived, illiquid and tiny. Aggregate market
capitalization was then below 4 000 million Euros. By the end of 2001, aggregate market capitalization was
above 73 thousand million Euros (down from 116 thousand million Euros by the end of 2000).
6 This was the case of GALP, the Portuguese oil refinery and distribution company. 
7 The initial transactions involved banks, insurance companies and brewers.
8 In April 1991, the new Capital Markets law (Lei Sapateiro) set up three market segments in the Portuguese
stock exchange. Regular firms, i.e. those firms meet all exchange requirements (in terms of capital dispersion,
market capitalization and solvency), are listed on Mercado de Cotações Oficiais (Market with Official
Quotations). Small and medium firms list on Segundo Mercado (Second Market). The firms that do not meet the
exchange requirements are traded on Mercado Sem Cotações (Market Without Quotations). From 2005 on, all
stocks listed either on Mercado de Cotações Oficiais or Segundo Mercado became listed on Euronext Lisbon.
9 For example, in Portugal, buying shares of privatized companies allowed tax allowances subject to a
minimum required holding period. The same applies for special tranches reserved to employees, immigrants,
small investors and even clients, placed at a discount relative to the offer price but again required a minimum
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Year of  Nr.  Gross Proceeds % of Partial 
Privatization Privatizations (€ thousand) Privatizations
Source: Dathis.
Notes: This table reports information concerning the 66 privatizations that occurred in Portugal from 1989-2001.
















Total Mean Median Std. Dev.
Notes: This table presents the gross proceeds (in thousand Euros) of Portuguese privatization public offerings, as well as its
breakdown in Initial (PIPOs) and Secondary Offers (PSPOs).
Table 3 – Gross Proceeds of Portuguese Private IPOs
Private IPOs (n=15) 419 535 16 959 29 216 27 969
Total Mean Median Std. Dev.
Notes: This table presents the main descriptive statistics for the Gross Proceeds (thousand Euros).
Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the gross proceeds of Portuguese private sector IPOs.
The sample comprises 15 IPOs and represents the universe of private sector transactions in the
sample period. PIPOS are on average much larger than private IPOs (10 times larger) and this is
similar to what has been reported in previous studies. The median time to listing for these
offerings was 3 days.4.1. Theoretical Predictions and Previous Findings
Previous evidence has shown that companies underprice their shares when they go public. The
underpricing has been also documented for PIPOs, in different countries and over different time
periods. The evidence from single country studies, in particular referring to Central and Eastern
European countries, is sometimes conflicting. Yet more recent studies, that use comprehensive
samples of operations across countries, show overwhelming evidence of positive and superior
initial returns for PIPOs compared with private IPOs10. Seasoned offerings are underpriced as
well, though much less so than PIPOs. 
Different theoretical arguments have been put forward to account for the observed privatization
initial returns.
According to asymmetric information theories, and as described by Huang and Levich (2003), it
is reasonable to expect that there should be less uncertainty about larger and mature firms,
operating in stable industries, as they are likely to be followed by more analysts, produce more
information about their activities, and possibly have longer periods of operation, than smaller and
younger firms established in new industries. If so, a more significant underpricing should be
observed for privatizations of smaller state-owned firms. Given that companies involved in private
IPOs are younger and in more dynamic industries, privatization IPOs should be less underpriced
and thus yield lower initial returns. Yet limited demand in small capital markets may dictate
greater underpricing for larger issues to ensure the success of the operation. Therefore a higher
degree of underpricing may be observed in larger privatization offerings. Asymmetric information
theories would also predict that underpricing is greater for transactions where the length of time
between offer price setting and first trade date is greater, and for initial privatization offerings. As
the scope and implications of the privatization program are revealed, uncertainty about offer
characteristics is reduced yielding diminishing initial returns over time11.
Political economic theories argue that governments pursue above all political objectives as
demonstrated by Perotti (1995) and Biais and Perotti (2002). This view argues, for example, that
shares are allocated for purchase at a discount by firm employees to gain employee political
support to the process of privatization. This suggests that initial returns in privatizations for which
a share tranche is reserved for employees, should exceed initial returns observed when there is
no such reserved tranche. Similarly, governments try to build political support during the early
stages of a privatization program by underpricing first privatization offers, which satisfies
investors and increases their confidence in the next offers. Higher initial returns should also be
expected whenever a privatization offer occurs on a year of parliamentary elections, before these
elections take place, to avoid shifting voting preferences among the population. Finally,
according to Biais and Perotti (2002), strategic privatization, by allocating significant share
ownership to a targeted section of the population, is mainly used by right-wing political parties. If
so, higher initial returns should be observed when right-wing parties are leading the country.
As for foreign participation, it is plausible to assume that governments that are concerned with
building domestic electoral support, bar foreigners from purchasing any part of the offer. If
underpricing occurs, a privatization program represents a wealth transfer from the state to
investors, and the government will be more subject to criticism the greater the foreign allocation.
The prediction is thus that higher initial returns should be observed in offers where there is no
share tranche reserved for foreigners and should be lower when foreign allocation increases. Yet
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10 The Megginson and Netter (2001) survey article in the Journal of Economic Literature presents a number of
studies examining initial returns in PIPOs that find positive significant initial performance. Yet some authors
show contradictory results. See for example Dewenter and Malatesta (1997).
11 In Baron (1982).
4. Short Run Market Performanceinternational diversification benefits would dictate that offer prices are higher in offerings with
foreign international investors due to extended capital supply and the presence of more
sophisticated investors12. In addition, the cross-listing of the shares of a privatized firm may be
seen as a signal of quality and government’s commitment to it through the privatization program.
This could resolve part of the uncertainty regarding firm value and result in higher initial offer
prices and therefore lower underpricing for those offers with a listing in foreign markets.
Agency theory models argue that managerial incentives and market monitoring are ineffective in
partial sales because the control shift to the private sector is incomplete, given the likelihood of a
government intervention later after the sale, and this impacts expected economic performance.
This is also true for sales of firms in regulated industries. The prediction is that partial
privatization offerings are riskier and therefore a greater underpricing is required to reassure and
convince investors to buy shares. Yet a government that is mainly concerned with revenue
maximization will be unwilling to underprice and will prefer total privatization.
Finally, the degree of underpricing depends on how the offer price was chosen. More and more
offer prices are set after a process of book building, in order to gather information on the demand
prices and orders. In such a setting, investors reveal their opinions and therefore underpricing
should be lower due to uncertainty resolution when such processes are used.
Evidence suggests that underpricing is more severe for state-owned firms in regulated industries,
consistent with the agency arguments (see for example Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997). Yet there
are conflicting results regarding the effect of partial privatization: several studies show returns are
positively related to the stake sold (see for example Jones, Megginson, Nash and Letter, 1999, and
Choi and Nam, 1998), suggesting governments choose above all to maximize revenues. 
In this paper we empirically investigate the arguments outlined above.
4.2 Methodology and Variables
We investigate if Portuguese privatization public offerings have positive initial returns. We use
the traditional event-study methodology (see for example Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997) to
measure privatization total and market-adjusted returns over one-day, seven-day and thirty-day
holding periods following the offer date13.
Raw returns are given by:
rit = log (Pi,t) – log (Pi,o) (1)
where
rit: raw, unadjusted return for stock i on day t;
Pi,t: closing price for stock i on day t following initial trade (t = 1, 7, 30); and
Pi,o: initial offer price for stock i (time index 0 refers to the issue date).
Abnormal returns are defined as market-adjusted returns:14
r*it = rit – rmt (2)
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12 Higher offer prices are due to an increase in demand for shares (demand effect).
13 For simplification, we use calendar day intervals and not trading days.
14 Alternative risk adjustment methods are not used because there is no pre-listing period concerning
privatized firms.where
r*it : market-adjusted return for company i on day t;
rmt: market return on day t, defined as log (It) – log (Io);
I t: stock market index level on day t; and
Io: stock market index level on the date the offer price was set.
To ensure that results are robust, market-adjusted returns were computed with reference to two
different indices.15 The indices used were PSI Geral (the reference index of Portuguese stocks)
and S&P 500. Stock market indices data is from Datastream International.
The use of offer prices for the calculation of initial returns creates some problems. In particular,
the time difference observed in the process of introducing shares into trading is, in some cases,
very long and as such, abnormal returns should be interpreted with caution.
Significance is assessed on the basis of Student’s t-test16. To check robustness, we performed a
Sign Test17.
We also investigate whether Portuguese PIPOs are more underpriced than Portuguese private
sector IPOs. We perform a difference t-test and Wilcoxson Mann-Whitney-U test to evaluate the
differences between initial returns of state-owned IPOs and private IPOs18.
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15 Results using FTSE 100 are also available upon request.
16 The test statistic assumes that abnormal returns are independently, identically and normally distributed and is
distributed as t-Student with degrees of freedom equal to the sample size minus one. The t-statistic is given by
where N is the number of companies in the sample. Given that there is no available data prior to the event, the
standard deviation of abnormal returns (s*) is estimated from the cross-section of event date abnormal returns.
See Serra (2004) for more details.
17 The Sign test is a non-parametric test used as an alternative to the t-test. The Sign test is a simple binomial
test of whether the fraction of positive abnormal residuals (p) equals 50%. The statistic
has an approximate unit normal distribution. p0 is the observed fraction of positive returns across firms in one
particular event period. If abnormal returns are independent, under the null hypothesis the number of non-
negative values of abnormal returns has a binomial distribution with parameter p. The alternative hypothesis, for
any level of abnormal performance, is that the proportion is different than that prior to it.
18 The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is a non-parametric test for comparing two population means (or medians)
based on independent samples. The statistic for the test is given by:
where Ki is the rank of the absolute value of abnormal returns of the first sample (PIPOs). It is assumed that none
of the absolute values are equal and that each is different from zero. Asymptotically, for N>M>10, the distribution
of T, under the null hypothesis of equally likely superior or inferior abnormal returns, will be normal with
N and M are, respectively, the number of firms of state-owned IPOs (19 observations) and private IPOs (15
∑ =
i
i K TFinally, in order to evaluate the importance of the several theoretical arguments reviewed above,
we perform a multivariate analysis. We use the following specification:
r*i = a + β1DAYSi + β2SIZEi + β3EMPi + β4FORi + β5ORDERi + β6PARTIALi + β7GOVi +
β8ELECTIONi + β9ADRi + εi
(3)
where
r*i : market-adjusted one, seven or thirty-day initial return for privatization offering i;
DAYS: number of days between the date of price setting and the first trade date;
SIZE: (log) total value of the privatization offer;
EMP: dummy variable that equals one for employee participation and zero otherwise;
FOR: dummy variable that equals one for foreign participation and zero otherwise;
ORDER: order of the privatization offering i within the country’s privatization program, that equals
one for the first share privatization offer sale, two for the second offer, and so forth;
PARTIAL: dummy variable that equals one if the privatization offering i is partial (fraction of
equity sold by the government inferior to 100%) and zero if 100% of the company is sold;
GOV: dummy variable that equals one if the privatization offering i occurred while a right-wing
party was governing the country and zero otherwise;
ELECTION: dummy variable that equals one if the privatization offering i occurred on a year of
parliamentary elections before elections took place, and zero otherwise; and
ADR: dummy variable that equals one if the stocks were listed in the form of ADRs in an
international capital market and zero otherwise.
According to asymmetric information theories it is reasonable to expect a lower degree of
underpricing for larger and more mature firms, operating in stable industries, as they are likely to
be followed closely by more analysts, produce more information about their activities, and
possibly have longer periods of operation, than smaller and younger firms established in new
industries. This effect is captured by the variable SIZE. Yet many privatizations occur in small
capital markets and a higher degree of underpricing may be required to warrant the placement of
the entire offer. Information asymmetry would also predict that the greater the length of time
between offer price setting and first trade date (DAYS), the higher the degree of underpricing.
The order of the offer (ORDER) may also affect initial returns: the degree of uncertainty about the
first privatization issue is much higher than other subsequent privatizations (in a sector or in
industry, in case of banks, beverages, insurance, pulp). Asymmetric information theories would
predict that – for subsequent offers – as the scope and the implications of the privatization
program are revealed, underpricing should be less severe. Finally, governments may list the
privatized shares in international exchanges (through ADRs), to signal quality and government’s
commitment to it through the privatization program. Therefore, initial returns should be higher for
those offers that were listed in foreign markets19. 
To investigate political economic arguments we use several different variables. If governments
are concerned with building political support, initial returns in privatizations where a share
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observations). If the underlying distribution is normal, the relative efficiency of this test against the t-test is 0.955
and is thus less powerful for smaller samples. This is no longer true if the abnormal returns are not normally
distributed. 
19 Yet this effect may be mitigated by the way the offer price was determined. More and more offer prices are
set after a process of book building involving large international institutional investors, reducing the degree of
underpricing.tranche is reserved to employees (EMP) should exceed initial returns where there is no such
reserved tranche. The variables GOV and ELECTION are also included to assess if privatization
is used by governments to retain political power: higher initial returns should be observed when
right-wing parties are leading the country, and when privatization occurs just before
parliamentary elections. Again if governments’ main concern is to assure political support, one
should observe that when foreign participation (FOR) is allowed, one should observe lower initial
returns as a result of higher offer prices to bar wealth transfers to foreigners. Yet one could
observe this same effect driven by greater demand for shares, improved risk sharing and lower
risk aversion that would enhance offer prices. Governments may also try to build political support
during the early stages of a privatization program by underpricing first offers (ORDER), which
satisfies investors and increases their confidence for subsequent offers. If the privatization offer
is partial (PARTIAL) a higher degree of underpricing may also be used as a means to assure and
convince investors to buy in subsequent offers. Partial sales may also require higher
underpricing to compensate for the fact that the control shift to the private sector is not effective
and therefore the impact on the firm’s expected economic performance is lower.
Data regarding governments in power in Portugal for the sample period, as well as information
concerning the parliamentary electoral dates, were obtained from the Portuguese Elections
National Commission20. Table 4 presents this information. 
Information concerning Portuguese privatized companies Depository Receipts listed in the US
was obtained in DR Directory of the Bank of New York. Table 5 summarizes this information.
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Date of the Election Winner party Right/Left wing 
Source: Comissão Nacional de Eleições.
Notes: This table reports summary information concerning the dates and the winners of parliamentary elections occurred in
Portugal during 1989-2002. PSD: Partido Social Democrata; PS: Partido Socialista.






















Forest Products & Paper
Building Materials
Electric Utilities
DR Issue Exchange Ratio ADR:ORD Industry Deposit Date
Source: Bank of New York DR Directory. 
Notes: This table reports summary information concerning Portuguese privatized companies depository receipts listed in the US.
4.3. Results
Table 6 shows the summary statistics of the raw and market-adjusted returns for the 42
Privatization Public Offerings in our sample. Average and median unadjusted and market-
adjusted returns over one- and seven-day periods are positive but statistically insignificant.Considering a holding period of 30 days, average market-adjusted returns become lower and are
even negative when we use the S&P 500 as the market benchmark. The parametric t-tests for all
periods in the analysis show that there is no significance at the 5% level. As such we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that initial returns of Portuguese Privatization Public Offerings are equal
to zero. These results do not confirm the findings reported in the literature for other countries.
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n = 42 Unadjusted  Market-Adjusted  Market-Adjusted 
Returns (%) PSI GERAL Returns (%) Returns (%) S&P 500
1 day 7 days 30 days 1 day 7 days 30 days 1 day 7 days 30 days
AR CAR CAR AR CAR CAR AR CAR CAR
Notes: This table presents the average and median unadjusted and market adjusted initial returns for 42 Portuguese Privatization
Public Offerings. Abnormal Returns (AR) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) are measured over intervals of 1, 7 and 30
calendar days following initial trading of the shares. Market index data refers to PSI GERAL and S&P 500. t-tests refer to two-
tailed tests. a denotes significance at the 5% level.
Yet, using a non-parametric test, the test statistical values obtained for the Sign Test allow us to
reject the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns at a 5% significance level for one and seven days
periods. For thirty-day periods results are consistent with the ones obtained from parametric tests.
As described above, some of these initial returns refer sometimes to very long periods because
for some stocks, trading is initialized months after the offer date. The variable Time to listing
ranges from a minimum of 1 day to a maximum of 476 days. To check if the most extreme
observations were affecting the returns we re-calculate the average abnormal return over one-,
seven- and thirty-day periods, excluding from the sample those companies that had a Time to
listing outside the third quartile of the distribution. We excluded 11 observations. The results
obtained for the remaining 31 Privatization Public Offerings are presented in Table 7. Average
unadjusted and market-adjusted returns over one-, seven- and thirty-day periods are now higher
than the ones obtained for the full sample of 42 Privatization Public Offerings, and the t-tests and
sign test are significant at the 5% level. Therefore, after deleting extreme observations, we reject
the null hypothesis that initial returns of these 31 Portuguese Privatization Public Offerings are
equal to zero, and confirm the phenomenon of underpricing in the short run. 
As initial and subsequent offerings have different nature, we removed the 23 subsequent
offerings from the sample to check if these transactions had influence on the results. Table 8
shows summary statistics of the initial returns for the 19 Portuguese PIPOs included in the
sample. Average and median unadjusted and market-adjusted returns are now higher than the
ones obtained with the initial sample of 42 transactions. In any case, initial returns are low and
barely significant, except for market-adjusted one-day returns using the PSI GERAL as the
market benchmark and the sign test over one- and seven-day periods. In addition to that, sample
size is very small affecting statistic inference.
We performed a comparative analysis by considering two sub-samples: PIPOs and private IPOs.
We compute initial returns to investors for the sub-sample of 19 PIPOs and compare these
returns with the ones observed for the control sample of private IPOs. Table 8 shows the raw and
market-adjusted returns for PIPOs and private IPOs. Junho '06 / (6/34)
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n = 31 Unadjusted  Market-Adjusted  Market-Adjusted 
Returns (%) Returns (%) PSI GERAL  Returns (%) S&P 500
1 day 7 days 30 days 1 day 7 days 30 days 1 day 7 days 30 days
AR CAR CAR AR CAR CAR AR CAR CAR
Notes: This table presents the average and median unadjusted and market adjusted initial returns for 31 Portuguese
Privatization Public Offerings. Returns (AR and CAR) are measured over intervals of 1, 7 and 30 calendar days following initial
trading of the shares. Market index data refers to PSI GERAL and S&P 500. t-tests refer to two-tailed tests. a denotes
significance at the 5% level.



















































PIPOs Unadjusted Market-Adjusted  Market-Adjusted 
n = 19 Returns (%) Returns (%) PSI GERAL  Returns (%) S&P 500
1 day 7 days 30 days 1 day 7 days 30 days 1 day 7 days 30 days



















































Private Unadjusted Market-Adjusted  Market-Adjusted 
IPOs n=15 Returns (%) Returns (%) PSI GERAL  Returns (%) S&P 500
1 day 7 days 30 days 1 day 7 days 30 days 1 day 7 days 30 days
AR CAR CAR AR CAR CAR AR CAR CAR
Notes: This table presents the average and median unadjusted and market adjusted initial returns for PIPOs and private IPOs.
Returns (AR and CAR) are measured over intervals of 1, 7 and 30 calendar days following initial trading of the shares. Market
index data refers to PSI GERAL and S&P 500. t-tests refer to two-tailed tests. a denotes significance at the 5% level.The sub-sample of PIPOs shows higher average and median unadjusted and market-adjusted
returns than those observed for the entire sample of Privatization offerings (initial and
subsequent) separately from subsequent offers. As for the 15 private IPOs, and for every holding
period considered in the analysis, the returns are positive and statistically significant.
As above, we re-calculated returns for PIPOs excluding from the sample those firms that had a
Time to listing outside the third quartile of the range (dropping 5 observations). The results,
shown in Table 9, are very similar to those above: abnormal returns are low and barely
significant.
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PIPOs Unadjusted Market-Adjusted  Market-Adjusted 
n = 14 Returns (%) Returns (%) PSI GERAL  Returns (%) S&P 500
1 day 7 days 30 days 1 day 7 days 30 days 1 day 7 days 30 days
AR CAR CAR AR CAR CAR AR CAR CAR
Notes: This table presents the average and median unadjusted and market adjusted initial returns for 14 PIPOs. Returns (AR and
CAR) are measured over intervals of 1, 7 and 30 calendar days following initial trading of the shares. Market index data refers to
PSI GERAL and S&P 500. t-test refers to two-tailed tests. a denotes significance at the 5% level.
Table 10 shows the test statistics for the difference t- and Mann Whitney U-tests. The results
indicate that we reject the null hypothesis that the average initial returns for PIPOs are equal to
the average initial return in private IPOs for a 30-day holding period. Student t and Mann-Whitney
U tests are consistent and significant at a 5% level. As for the one- and the seven-day analyses,
the statistics for the difference t-tests are insignificant. Yet the non-parametric test allows us to
reject the null hypothesis that the price impact of PIPOs and private IPOs is the same.
Overall, results suggest that privatizations yield, on average, lower initial returns than private new
offerings, which contradicts previous research reporting that PIPOs tend to be more underpriced
than other IPOs. In Almeida and Duque (2005), the average initial return for the 24 IPOs analyzed
(that include PIPOs) is positive (7.27%) and statistically significant. We find a lower underpricing
effect. This may stem from the fact that we use a more extensive sample period that includes
more recent offerings for which underpricing was lower. Our result could either reflect uncertainty
resolution as the privatization process evolved or lower demand for later offerings or both. 
To identify the factors that may affect the short-term price behavior in privatization offerings, we
run univariate tests to check for differences in market-adjusted one-day returns for several sub-
samples formed on the basis of the dummy variables. These are employee participation (EMP),
foreign participation (FOR), partial or total privatization (PARTIAL), political party of the
government that leads the country (GOV), date of the parliamentary elections (ELECTION) and
ADR listing (ADR). Results are presented in Table 11. 
The results are very weak except for the dummy variable GOV. The results suggest that
whenever the privatization offering occurs with a left-wing party governing the country, (one-day
market adjusted returns using the S&P 500 as the market benchmark) initial returns are higher,
which contradicts the hypothesis that right-wing parties are more populist and make more use of
privatization offers to attract voters political support as a strategic policy to retain power.Junho '06 / (6/34)
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PIPOs Private IPOs Difference in Returns
Period Raw Market Market Raw Market Market Raw PSI S&P 
Return Adjusted Adjusted Return Adjusted Adjusted (1) GERAL 500
(1) Return Return (1) Return Return (2) (3)
PSI S&P  PSI S&P
GERAL 500 GERAL 500
(2) (3) (2) (3)
Notes: This table reports the average difference in initial returns of state-owned (19 observations) and privately-owned offerings
(15 observations). Returns are in %. t- and z-tests refer to two-tailed (t-Student and Wilcoxson Mann-Whitney U) tests. a denotes
significance at the 5% level.






































Variable Difference in Returns Difference in Returns
(PSI GERAL) (%) (S&P 500) (%) 
Notes: This table reports the average difference in market-adjusted one-day returns for sub-samples of the 42 Portuguese
privatization public offerings formed on the basis of six dummy variables: employee participation (EMP), foreign participation
(FOR), partial or total privatization (PARTIAL), party of the government that leads the country (GOV), date of the parliamentary
elections (ELECTION) and ADR listing (ADR). Returns are in %. t-tests refer to two-tailed tests. a denotes significance at the
5% level.We also performed this univariate analysis considering just the sample of 19 PIPOs. Results are
shown in Table 12.
The results obtained from the tests continue to be very weak and lack statistical significance. In
fact, when considering only the 19 PIPOs in the sample the dummy variable GOV is no longer
statistically significant, despite its negative sign.
In order to test the impact of the firm belonging or not to the financial sector (banks and
insurance companies), we divided the sample of 42 observations into transactions of financial
firms (23 observations) and non-financial firms (19 observations). The results are presented in
Table 13. The results suggest the underpricing of financial firms is greater but the results are not
statistically significant.
Results of the multivariate analysis are presented in Table 14. The fit of the model is extremely
poor and the individual parameter estimates are not significant21. The signs of the coefficients of
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Table 12 – Tests of Differences in Market-Adjusted One-day Returns for Sub-Samples 





































Variable Difference in Returns Difference in Returns
(PSI GERAL) (%) (S&P 500) (%) 
Notes: This table reports the average difference in market-adjusted one-day returns for sub-samples of the 19 Portuguese privatiza-
tion initial public offerings formed on the basis of six dummy variables: employee participation (EMP), foreign participation (FOR),
partial or total privatization (PARTIAL), party of the government that leads the country (GOV), date of the parliamentary elections
(ELECTION) and ADR listing (ADR). Returns are in %. t-tests refer to two-tailed tests. a denotes significance at the 5% level.
Table 13 – Tests of Differences in Market-Adjusted One-day Returns for Sub-Samples 







Variable Difference in Returns Difference in Returns
(PSI GERAL) (%) (S&P 500) (%) 
Notes: This table reports the average difference in market-adjusted one-day returns for sub-samples of the 42 Portuguese
privatization public offerings formed on the basis of the dummy variable FIN that equals 1 if the firm is a bank or an insurance
company (23 observations) and 0 otherwise (19 observations). Returns are in %. t-tests refer to two-tailed tests. a denotes
significance at the 5% level. Results obtained for one and seven-day market-adjusted returns are available upon request. 
21 The t-statistics after performing the White correction are very similar and are available upon request.the explanatory variables SIZE, ORDER, PARTIAL and ADR are as predicted by the literature:
the degree of underpricing is greater for initial offerings, when the privatization is partial and
when shares are cross-listed. As for the variables DAYS, EMP, GOV and ELECTION the signs of
the coefficients contradict the theoretical arguments. The underpricing is lower for large issues,
with right-wing parties, and in the years elections took place. Results for the dummy variable
FOR are also not significant, suggesting that the influence of foreign investors on the
privatization initial returns is trivial22.
In sum, PIPOs seem to start trading below their market value as observed with IPOs. The results
of univariate and the multivariate analyses performed to inform about the determinants of the
observed underpricing are not conclusive. Yet even if, for several of the variables analyzed to
account for the different arguments, the economic relationships are as predicted, the estimates
lack statistical significance and this may stem in part from the small sample in our study. Overall
results seem to be consistent with asymmetric information and agency arguments and do no
support the claim that governments deliberately underprice privatization offerings for political
factors as predicted by Biais and Perotti (2002).
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22 We run the regression for the sub-sample excluding the “outliers” as described above. The results are very
similar except for the specification explaining one-day initial returns where the negative coefficient of the
variable ORDER is now statistically significant at a 5% level.





































































30 days Market-Adjusted Returns
(Market index: PSI GERAL) (Market index: S&P 500) 
Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic
Notes: This table shows the estimates of the regression of market-adjusted initial returns for 42 Portuguese Privatization Public
Offerings against the number of days between price setting and first trade date (DAYS); the log of total value of the privatization
offer (SIZE); Dummy variables for employee participation (EMP), foreign participation (FOR), partial or total privatization
(PARTIAL), party of the government that leads the country (GOV), date of the parliamentary elections (ELECTION) and ADR
listing (ADR); and a discrete variable that equals one for the first share sale privatization offer, two for the second offer, and so
forth (ORDER). Parameters are estimated by ordinary least squares regression. t-tests refer to two-tailed tests. a denotes
significance at the 5% level.5.1. Theoretical Predictions and Previous Findings
Several studies examine the long run returns from privatization offerings. While in private IPOs
there seems to be strong evidence of negative long-term returns, in privatization offerings the
international evidence, in particular studies based on large international samples, suggest that
the long-term performance of privatization offerings is positive and that PIPOs outperform IPOs
or firms from matching samples23. The most recent studies cover a large number of countries
(and offerings) and use several methods to control for several problems with estimates and test
statistics of long run returns, and the positive performance is robust to these tests24. Further the
results suggest that PIPOS outperform IPOs25. Yet some studies indicate that privatization
offerings underperform in the long run. This underperformance is mainly observed for emerging
markets and privatization-related ADRs26. Altogether, there seems to be no manifest conflicting
performance results regarding the long-term performance of privatization issues, given that the
studies that found underperformance refer to the particular case of emerging markets offerings in
foreign exchanges.
Most studies analyze the returns earned by investors who buy privatized shares at the first
closing market prices and hold stocks up to 1, 3 and 5 years. In addition, a few studies investigate
the determinants of the observed returns. Several explanations have been put forward to account
for the long run performance of privatized shares. While some arguments are valid for any IPOs,
privatization offerings have different characteristics that have to be accounted for.
Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994) present three possible explanations for the long run
performance of IPOs: divergence of opinion, the empresario hypothesis and windows of
opportunities. Ritter (1991) tries to capture these effects with variables such as size, age,
industry and initial underpricing27. For the particular case of privatization offerings, additional
variables that may affect long run performance are associated with management shifts resulting
from the transfer of state to private ownership, and the resulting improvements in economic
efficiency. Political risk is an obvious distinctive feature of privatization offerings that may play an
important role in understanding the behavior of returns over time.
Boardman and Laurin (2000) use a variable to measure the timing of a particular offering within
the process of privatization in a country. They also account for the portion of retained
government ownership (and golden shares) and for different regulating and competitive
environments. Perotti and Van Oijen (2001) also use a proxy for political risk and suggest that
the progressive resolution of political risk as the privatization program evolves, leads to more
positive returns. Yet, in the long run, after the initial correction, one should observe lower returns
reflecting lower risk. Finally, and similarly to what happens with private IPOs, the decision to
cross-list may impact on the returns of the privatized firm’s shares in the long run28.
In this paper we ask whether the arguments above can account for the long-term performance of
Portuguese PIPOs. Very little is known about the determinants of the long run returns in
privatizations. Further the explanatory variables that have been looked to in previous studies can
account for several different theoretical arguments. For example, Boardman and Laurin (2000)
find that privatizations, occurring later in the process, show greater excess positive returns but
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5. Long Run Market Performance
23 For evidence regarding the long-term performance of IPOs and PIPOs respectively, please refer to table
B2.2 in Jenkinson and Ljungkvist (2001) and table 9 in Megginson and Netter (2001).
24 See for example Barber and Lyon (1997) or Kothari and Warner (1997).
25 See for example Boardman and Laurin (2000), Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) and Jelic and Briston (2003).
26 See for example Foerster and Karolyi (2000), Aybar (2002) and, more recently, Jia, Sun and Tong (2005).
27 Boardman and Laurin (2000) report that privatization offerings are larger and older and operate in more
mature industries and have therefore lower growth prospects than the typical IPO firm.
28 See Foerster and Karolyi (2000).this effect could equally support agency, asymmetry or political risk arguments. Similarly, Aybar
(2002) shows that emerging market PIPOs underperform developed markets issues. Yet this
difference could validate political as well as agency risk arguments.
5.2. Methodology
To investigate long run performance we use the methodology proposed by Ritter (1991) as in
several other single-country studies. We investigate the sign and magnitude of long run abnormal
returns to investors in Portuguese privatization offerings. Further we analyse if there are
statistically significant differences between PIPOs’ and private IPOs’ long run performance.
Abnormal returns are defined as in (2). The average market-adjusted return on a sample of N
companies in event period t is the equally weighted arithmetic average of the benchmark-
adjusted returns:
(4)
The cumulative market-adjusted aftermarket performance from q to s is the summation of the
average market-adjusted returns:
(5)
The parametric tests proposed in the literature rely on the important assumption that abnormal
returns are normally distributed. We use the standard t-statistic to test the significance of
abnormal returns29.
To check the robustness of the results, we performed a procedure based on calendar-time
portfolio returns. The use of this method is an attempt to eliminate the problem of cross-sectional
dependence among sample firms once the returns of sample firms are aggregated into a single
portfolio.
Considering the period from 1989 to 2001, we calculate, for each offering i, the six months
abnormal return (ARi) over the sample period. For each holding six-month period, we create an
equally-weighted portfolio of the existing offerings for that particular period. The mean abnormal
return – MARt – across firms in the portfolio is given by:
(6)
where
nt is the number of active firms in that six-month period (t).
Subsequently, we calculate the grand mean for the T six-month periods abnormal returns
(MMAR), given by:
(7)
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ntwhere
T is the number of six month periods over the total sample period.
To test the null hypothesis of zero mean six-month period abnormal returns, a t-statistic is
estimated using the time-series standard deviation of the observed six-month abnormal returns:
(8)
To conduct the multivariate analysis we follow the model proposed by Boardman and Laurin
(2000). They regress three-year CARs against (i) the relative size of the firm, measured by the
market capitalization of the privatized firm divided by the total capitalization of the market; (ii) the
percentage of ownership retained by the government; (iii) a dummy variable that equals one if
the government retains a special share (Golden Share) and zero otherwise; (iv) the initial
underpricing measured by the returns earned in the first days after listing; and (v) a dummy
variable that equals one if the privatization occurred relatively late in the country’s privatization
program and zero otherwise. Hence our specification is:
CAR1,36 i = β1MRi + β2SIZEi + β3ORDERi + β4PARTIALi + β5ADRi + β6LATEi + εi
(9)
where
CAR1, 36 i: three-year cumulative abnormal returns for privatization offering i;
MR: market-adjusted (one-, seven- or thirty-day) initial return; 
LATE: dummy variable that equals one if the privatization offering occurred relatively late in the
country’s privatization program and zero otherwise.
SIZE, ORDER, PARTIAL and ADR are defined as in section 4.2 above.
The variable MR that refers to the initial underpricing may be seen as a proxy for over optimism.
Perotti (1995) shows that when the policy uncertainty is high, underpricing is seen as a sign for a
government’s commitment to the privatization program. Therefore, a higher degree of
underpricing should have a positive effect on long run privatization returns. On the other hand,
that kind of commitment may reduce the premium required by investors and yield lower required
returns in the long run.
The effect of SIZE on long run stock price performance stems from asymmetric information
theories. It is reasonable to expect that there should be less uncertainty about larger and mature
firms, operating in stable industries, than in smaller and younger firms established in new
industries. In fact, the existence of lower uncertainty implies lower risk and, subsequently, lower
required returns for larger offerings. In that case, small size offerings would show higher long-
term returns due to higher uncertainty. Yet several authors suggest that smaller firms should
outperform larger firms due to greater improvement in economic efficiency.
The ORDER of the offer may also affect long run returns. If it is a first privatization offer, the
government will retain some percentage of ownership to sell eventually in subsequent offerings.
This might be interpreted as a signal that the government is still interested in the company, which
would lead to a negative relationship between the order of the offer and long run performance.
This effect may be better captured by the variable PARTIAL due to the fact that if governments
decide not to sell immediately 100% of the shares of the companies, but prefer to do it slowly,
investors may interpret this as a positive sign of commitment to the privatization program, having
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also reflect the interference of the government in the offerings and, therefore, higher risk leading
to higher returns.
As for the explanatory variable ADR, listing the privatization offering on an international market
may be seen as a sign of quality and the government’s commitment to the privatization program,
reflecting lower risk and lower required returns. In addition, one could expect that returns would
be lower reflecting lower required returns due to the presence of sophisticated foreign investors.
Finally the variable LATE, motivated by Boardman and Laurin (2000), measures the effect of
when a specific offer occurred in a particular country. This variable equals one if the privatization
occurred relatively late in the country’s privatization program and zero otherwise. In fact, early
privatization offerings that had no previous track record, might have been considered riskier. 
5.3. Results
Table 15 shows the six-month ARs and CARs for 6, 12, 18, 24, 30 and 36 months after the
offering. ARs and CARs are negative for the first 6 and 12 months and for horizon periods over
30 months. Results are only statistically significant for the S&P 500 benchmark.
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Table 15 – Long-Term Average Abnormal Returns (AR) and Average Cumulative Abnormal






































Months Nr. firms ARt (%) t-stat. (ARt) CARt (%) t-stat. (CARt)
S&P 500





































Notes: This table shows the ARs and CARs for the 42 Portuguese privatization offerings. The number of firms varies over time
due to de-listing and new firms. t-tests refer to two-tailed tests. a denotes significance at the 5% level.
Results of ARs using the calendar-time approach are presented in Table 16. As above, returns
are not statistically significant and vary according to the market benchmark used in each case.
The occurrence of both positive and negative signs in periodic returns over time could reflect the
fact that we compute returns for the aggregate sample (initial and secondary offerings).Abnormal Returns in Privatization Public Offerings: 
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Period Nr. firms MARt (%) Period Nr. firms MARt (%)
































































Period Nr. firms MARt (%) Period Nr. firms MARt (%)
Notes: This table shows the six-month mean average returns (MAR) for the 42 Portuguese privatization offerings using the
calendar-time portfolio method. The number of firms varies over time. t-tests refer to two-tailed tests. MMAR denotes the grand
mean of six-month abnormal returns over the entire sample period.
Table 17 – Long-Term Average Abnormal Returns (AR) and Average Cumulative Abnormal






































Months Nr. firms ARt (%) t-stat. (ARt) CARt (%) t-stat. (CARt)
S&P 500





































Notes: This table shows the ARs and CARs for the 19 Portuguese PIPOs. The number of firms varies over time due to de-listing.
t-tests refer to two-tailed tests. a denotes significance at the 5% level.Table 17 presents the excess returns for the sub-sample of PIPOs. Abnormal returns are, as
above, very negative for the first and last periods. CARs are consistently negative over the
period. Yet the results are only statistically significant when considering S&P 500 as the
benchmark and for longer holding periods of 30 and 36 months. When we compare these results
with the evidence in table 15, we observe that in the long run, PIPOs seem to severely
underperform later offerings. This could merely reflect a correction in prices that takes place after
the initial price run-up that is observed in PIPOs. 
We checked the robustness of the results, computing calendar-returns for the 19 PIPOs sub-
sample. Results are shown in Table 18. For the sub-sample of PIPOs the grand mean is positive
regardless of the chosen benchmark but long-term calendar returns are statistically insignificant.
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Period Nr. firms MARt (%) Period Nr. firms MARt (%)
(continua)Table 19 shows the long-term performance of private IPOs. ARs and CARs start being positive in
the first 6 months, decreasing afterwards to negative values for up to three years. Yet, again,
results are not statistically significant, except for ARs in the first half of the second year following
the offering and when the S&P 500 is used as the market benchmark for CARs over longer
horizon periods (24 months or more).
To evaluate if the Portuguese private IPOs and PIPOs show different long-term performance we
use a difference t-test and a Mann-Whitney U test. Table 20 reports the results.
The null hypothesis that the average CAR for PIPOs is equal to the average CAR for private
IPOs is not rejected for all event periods considered in the analysis. Privatizations seem to yield,
on average, lower CARs than private offerings up to 1 year. Over longer horizon periods, private
IPOs tend do underperform PIPOs30. Please notice that the significance statistics are very alike
for the two tests (parametric and non parametric).
We then analyze if the variables used as proxies for the different theoretical arguments
discussed above could account for the long-term return behavior in Portuguese privatization
offerings. First, we performed univariate analyses to check for differences in the three-year CARs
















































































































Period Nr. firms MARt (%) Period Nr. firms MARt (%)
30 Almeida and Duque (2005) report that, on average, Portuguese offerings underperform after one year. Yet
the value-weighted average excess return is positive.Abnormal Returns in Privatization Public Offerings: 
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Table 19 – Long-Term Average Abnormal Returns (AR) and Average Cumulative Abnormal






































Months Nr. firms ARt (%) t-stat. (ARt) CARt (%) t-stat. (CARt)
S&P 500











































































Months Difference Difference 
in CARs (%) in CARs (%)
(PSI GERAL) (S&P500)
Notes: This table shows the ARs and CARs for the 15 Portuguese private IPOs. The number of firms varies over time due to de-
listing and new firms. t-tests refer to two-tailed tests. a denotes significance at the 5% level. 
Notes: This table reports the average difference in CARs of PIPOs (19 observations) and privately-owned companies IPOs (15
observations). Returns are in %. t- and z-tests refer to two-tailed (t-Student and Mann-Whitney U) tests. a denotes significance at
the 5% level. for sub-samples formed on the basis of the dummy variables PARTIAL, ADR and LATE. The first
two variables have been defined This last variable measures if the privatization offering occurred
relatively late in the country. We considered that an offer occurred late if it was launched three
years after the first issue. Results are presented in Table 21. The differences in returns are
consistent with the predictions explained above. Yet the tests are not statistically significant,
except for the dummy variable PARTIAL (using as market benchmark the PSI GERAL).
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Variable Difference Difference 
in Returns in Returns
(PSI GERAL) (S&P500)
Notes: This table reports the average difference in three-year CARs for sub-samples of the 42 privatization offerings formed on the
basis of the three dummy variables. t- and z-tests refer to two-tailed (t-Student and Mann-Whitney U) tests. a denotes significance
at the 5% level.




























Variable Difference Difference 
in Returns in Returns
(PSI GERAL) (S&P500)
Notes: This table reports the average difference in three-year CARs for sub-samples of the 19 privatization initial offerings formed
on the basis of the three dummy variables. t- and z-tests refer to two-tailed (t-Student and Mann-Whitney U) tests. a denotes
significance at the 5% level.
We conducted the same univariate analysis for the sub-sample of 19 PIPOs. Table 22 shows the
results. Overall results suggest that these variables cannot explain the observed performance.
To assess the impact of the firm being or not being part of the financial sector on long run returns,
we split the initial sample of 42 observations into financial firms and non-financial firms. The
results in Table 23 are inconclusive.To further investigate the determinants of the observed performance, we obtained estimates of
the OLS multivariate regression. Results are shown in Table 24. Most of the estimates lack
statistical significance, except for the variable PARTIAL31. The positive and statistically
significant coefficient obtained for the explanatory variable PARTIAL could suggest that, when a
government privatizes partially, investors require higher returns anticipating government
interference in the privatized firms and, therefore, higher political risk. The observed effect would
thus contradict the argument that partial privatization signals government commitment and
reduces uncertainty, and is inconsistent with arguments that predict higher returns for total
privatizations for larger expected economic efficiency gains. The downward shift in returns,
reflected in the intercept estimate, is thus offset (more than offset when we look at S&P 500
market adjusted returns) by the effect of partial privatization.
Abnormal Returns in Privatization Public Offerings: 
The Case of Portuguese Firms
Carla Vieira; Ana Paula Serra











Variable Difference Difference 
in Returns in Returns
(PSI GERAL) (%) (S&P500) (%)
Notes: This table reports the average difference in three-year CARs for sub-samples of the 42 privatization offerings formed on the
basis of the dummy variable FIN that equals 1 if the firm is a bank or an insurance company (23 observations) and 0 otherwise (19
observations). Returns are in %. t- and z-tests refer to two-tailed (t-Student and Mann-Whitney U) tests. a denotes significance at
the 5% level.




















































(Market index: PSI GERAL) (Market index: S&P 500) 
Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic
Notes: This table shows the parameters estimated for the regression of three-year CARs for 42 Portuguese privatization offerings
against initial underpricing (market-adjusted thirty-day initial returns) (MR); the log of total value of the privatization offer (SIZE);
dummy variables distinguishing partial or total privatization (PARTIAL), ADR listing (ADR) and the timing of privatization (LATE);
ORDER that equals one for the first share sale privatization offer, two for the second offer, and so forth. Parameters are estimated
by ordinary least squares regression. t-tests refer to two-tailed tests. a denotes significance at the 5% level. Results obtained for
one and seven-day market-adjusted returns are available upon request. 
(*) Statistically significant sign using t-statistics with White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
31 The t-statistics with White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are very similar.Junho '06 / (6/34)
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The coefficient associated with the variable MR is positive, suggesting as expected that when the
underpricing is large, and after controlling for other effects, this is perceived by investors as a sign
of government commitment to that privatization offering. Yet the large part of the initial positive
return is nevertheless reversed (if we sum this effect with the intercept estimate). This negative
aftermarket effect is consistent with overreaction and fads in PIPOs. 
As for the other explanatory variables, the results are mixed and the signs reverse with the choice
of the market benchmark.
In sum, we find that long-term excess returns are negative (but seldom significant), even if
Portuguese PIPOs outperform private IPOs32. The statistics for the difference in means tests are
also inconclusive and most of the estimates of the OLS regression lack statistical significance.
Again, like the analysis in section 4, this lack of significance may result from small sample size.
Overall results suggest that the initial price overreaction seems to be corrected in the aftermarket
and that investors require a premium when they anticipate further offerings.
This paper evaluates the short- and long-term performance of Portuguese privatization offerings
and investigates the determinants of the observed performance. Our main findings are: 
1. Portuguese privatization offerings show initial positive returns but lack statistical significance.
2. Portuguese privatization IPOs underperform private sector IPOs contradicting most of the
previous evidence.
3. Results suggest that the degree of underpricing is greater for initial offerings, when the
privatization is partial and when shares are cross-listed. The underpricing is lower for large
issues, with right-wing political parties in government and in the years before elections. Overall
these results are consistent with information asymmetry and agency predictions.
4. In the long run, privatization offerings have negative abnormal returns, contradicting the most
recent evidence. Yet these results lack statistical significance. While in early event months,
privatization public offerings yield more negative returns than private sector offerings, this effect
is reversed in longer horizon periods. 
5. Our results suggest that initial overreaction seems to be partially reversed in the years
following the offer and that investors require higher returns in partial privatizations.
6. The small sample size may explain partially why we fail to find statistically significant average
excess returns and non-trivial influences for the variables we investigate.
6. Conclusions
32 Previous studies (for example Kothari and Warner, 1997) show that survivorship bias impacts seriously on
long-term performance. In fact, in our study, only 7 of the 19 PIPOs (22 of the 42 privatization offerings) are
listed in 2001. If de-listings were related with bad/good performance, correcting the bias would show more/less
negative performance. The results for the calendar portfolio-approach are inconclusive and do not illuminate the
direction of the bias. We could have repeated the CAR analysis for the survivors but results would be
meaningless given the small sample size.Abnormal Returns in Privatization Public Offerings: 
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